A Generalized Nash Game for Computation Offloading with an Extension to an MPEC/EPEC Structure

Daniel Nowak, Alexandra Schwartz

The number of tasks which are performed on wireless devices instead of stationary computers is steadily increasing. Due to limited resources on these mobile devices computation offloading became a relevant concept. We investigate a nonconvex generalized Nash game for a group of mobile users in which each user tries to minimize his own task completion time. For this the users can offload parts of their computation task to a connected cloudlet with limited computation power. Here, the time restriction resulting from offloading is formulated as a vanishing constraint. We show that a unique Nash equilibrium exists and that the price of anarchy is one, i.e. the equilibrium coincides with a centralized solution. Further we consider the possibility for some users to have a temporal advantage, which leads to an MPEC/EPEC structure.

This work is supported by the 'Excellence Initiative' of the German Federal and State Governments and the Graduate School of Computational Engineering at Technische Universit├Ąt Darmstadt.